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Abstract
Rising inequality a¤ects the composition of asset demands as well as
aggregate demand. The poor have few nancial assets and their portfolio
is skewed towards xed-income assets. The rich, by contrast, hold a large
proportion of their wealth in stocks. Thus, an increase in inequality tends
to raise the demand for stocks. This generates capital gains, and these
gains can fuel a bubble, as desired portfolios shift further towards stocks.
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1 Introduction
Most if not all strands of heterodox macroeconomics view the share of prots as
an important determinant of aggregate demand and economic performance. The
details di¤er, but the centrality of income distribution is common ground. This
emphasis on distribution is surely warranted but it may be a mistake to focus
narrowly on the functional distribution. In the US the great compressionin the
1940s saw earnings inequality plummet, but starting in the late 1970s inequality
has risen and is now at levels comparable to those in the 1920s: the income
share of the top ten percent fell from about 45 percent in the 1930s to about 32
percent in the period from the late 1940s to the early 1970s, and then rose to
above 45 percent in 2008.1
The sources of the changes in distribution are hotly debated.2 This paper,
however, focuses on some macroeconomic implications of increasing inequality,
and for present purposes the precise reasons for the increase do not matter.
Heterodox models routinely assume di¤erent saving rates out of wages and
prots, but rising earnings inequality can reduce aggregate demand, even if the
functional distribution is una¤ected. The stagnationist tendencies can be o¤set
at least temporarily by asset market bubbles, and central banks have little
incentive to burst the bubbles if demand is weak. In this sense increasing in-
equality may be said to permit the development of bubbles. In fact, a rise in
inequality may also contribute to the initial creation of a bubble if policy makers
reduce interest rates in response to a weakening of aggregate demand. Impor-
tant as the policy-related connections may be, my argument here is di¤erent:
the size distribution of income may have direct e¤ects on nancial markets.
The Survey of Consumer Finances shows that low and middle income groups
have few nancial assets.3 Their wealth-income ratio is lower than that of the
rich, and the composition of their portfolio is di¤erent. Housing makes up a
larger fraction, and their holdings of nancial assets are skewed towards xed
income assets. The rich, by contrast, hold a large proportion of their wealth
in stocks. Thus, in 2001 stockholding households had average net worth that
was 3-4 times higher than that of non-stockholding households, and the mean
and median share of stocks in nancial assets was 9.2 and 0.0, respectively, for
households with a head of household aged between 55 and 64 and net worth
1See Alvaredo et al. (2011). This database also shows that a great compression can be
observed in other countries and that the recent increase in inequality is widespread.
2Mainstream explanations of the rise in inequality give a lot of weight to skill-biased
technological change. But even if technological change has played a role, the critical feature
may have been power biases, rather than skill biases (Skott and Guy 2007, Guy and Skott
2008).
The literature on neoliberalism and nancialization has emphasized pressures on the wage
share (e.g. Crotty (2005), Palley (2007), Hein (2008) and Epstein and Jayadev (2007)). Out-
sourcing and the threat of outsourcing, for instance, may have raised rmsbargaining power.
Workers have also been weakened by the institutional changes in the labor market, including
a decline of unions and a falling minimum wage. The fall in the minimum wage, moreover,
may have hurt low-wage workers in terms of employment as well as wages (Slonimczyk and
Skott 2010).
3Bucks et al. (2009) present an overview of the ndings.
1
between $10,000 and $100,000, but 31.5 and 30.5 percent for households with
net worth above $1 million ((Curcuru et al. (2005, Tables 4 and 6)).
These patterns are what one would expect. Essentially, the poor have few
nancial assets and their portfolio is skewed towards xed income assets. The
rich, by contrast, hold a large proportion of their wealth in stocks. An increase
in inequality therefore tends to raise the demand for stocks and with a given
supply, the result is a rising stock market. Boosted by capital gains, the return
on equity now rises. The desired portfolio compositions react to the change in
relative returns, and this can fuel a bubble as the portfolios now shift further
towards stocks. Although intuitively straightforward, the interactions are quite
complex and a formalization is useful to examine the argument in greater detail.
Section 2 presents the formal model and Section 3 examines its implications.
Section 4 contains a few concluding comments.
2 Model
The purpose of the model is quite limited: the focus is on the e¤ects of changes
in earnings inequality on asset demands and asset prices. To keep things simple,
I assume that aggregate demand follows a steady growth path through policy
or good luck and that aggregate income grows at the constant rate g:
There are two distinct groups of households, rich and poor. In both groups
consumption is determined by income and wealth, but the rich have a lower
consumption propensity out of income,
CP = aYP + bWP (1)
CR = aYR + bWR (2)
where C; Y and W denote consumption, income and wealth, respectively, and
subscripts P and R refer to poor and rich; the parameters a; b and  satisfy the
inequalities 0 < a < 1; b > 0; 0 <  < 1:
There are two nancial assets, bank deposits (M) and stocks (N), as in
Skott (1989). For simplicity, the real rate of return on deposits is zero while
the return on stocks comes in the form of a combination of dividends and capital
gains. The portfolio composition di¤ers across households, and as an extreme
version of the stylized pattern, it is assumed that poor households have only
bank deposits while rich households own both deposits and stocks. Thus,
MP = WP (3)
MR = (1  )WR (4)
vNR = WR (5)
M = MP +MR (6)
W = WP +WR =M + vN (7)
where v is the price of shares and NR the number of shares owned by the rich.
The portfolio composition of the rich (the value of ) is predetermined at any
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moment, but a change in the expected rate of return on equity will lead to
adjustments in .
Householdsbudget constraints are given by
CP + _MP = YP (8)
CR + _MR + v _N = YR (9)
Using (1), (3) and (8) the wealth dynamics for the poor is determined by
W^p = (1  a) YP
WP
  b = (1  a) 1
qP
  b (10)
where qP is the ratio of wealth to income.
Turning to the rich, we have (using (2), (4)-(5) and (9))
W^R = (1  a) 1
qR
  b+ _vN
WR
(11)
The term _vN represents capital gains on equity holdings, and these capital gains
are determined endogenously. The equilibrium condition for the equity market
is given by
NR = N (12)
where N is the number of outstanding shares. The rate of (net) new issues in the
US is typically low, often negative, and for simplicity, N is taken as constant.
With this assumption, we have
_vN = _WR +  _WR
= _WR + [(1  a)YR   bWR + _vN ] (13)
Hence,
_vN
WR
=
_
1   +

1   (1  a)
1
qR
  
1  b (14)
Using (11) and (14) It follows that
W^R =
_
1   +
1
1   (1  a)
1
qR
  1
1  b (15)
Aggregate income is made up of three components, distributed incomes to
the rich, distributed income to the poor and rmsretained earnings. Assuming
a constant prot share () and a constant retention rate out of prots (sf ), we
have
YR = (1  s)xY (16)
YP = (1  s)(1  x)Y (17)
where s = sf; Y is aggregate income and x = YRYR+YP is the share of the rich in
distributed income. By assumption aggregate output grows at the rate g, and
it follows that
Y^R = g + x^ (18)
Y^P = g   x
1  xx^ (19)
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Combining (10), (15) and (18)-(19), nally, we get expressions for the growth
rates of the two wealth-income ratios,
q^R =
1  a
1  
1
qR
  1
1  b+
_
1     g   x^ (20)
q^P = (1  a) 1
qP
  b  g + x
1  xx^ (21)
3 Implications
3.1 Constant 
The dynamics of the system (20)-(21) is simple if both  and x are constant. In
this case equations (20) and (21) constitute two independent rst order di¤er-
ential equations. They are both stable and qP and qR converge monotonically
towards the stationary solutions,
qP ! qP =
1  a
b+ g
(22)
qR ! qR =
1  a
b+ (1  )g (23)
The wealth income ratio of the rich exceeds that of the poor for two separate
reasons: their consumption rate is lower ( < 1) which increases the numerator
and they hold part of their wealth in equity ( > 0) which reduces the denom-
inator. The rst e¤ect is straightforward and the second also has an intuitive
explanation. Rising incomes and a constant portfolio composition mean that
the rich want to increase the value of both deposits and equity holdings. The
increase in deposits requires saving out of current income but since the number
of shares is given, the rich as a group cannot buy additional shares. Instead,
the desired increase in equity holdings is achieved through capital gains: eq-
uity prices are being bid up as the rich try to raise their equity holdings, and
this process does not come to halt until the value of their holdings is at the
desired level. The induced capital gains reduce the saving rate that is required
for wealth to grow at the rate g:4
Note nally, that the steady-state value of the aggregate wealth-income ratio
(q) is increasing in both x and : This follows directly from the denition of the
q as the weighted average of qP and qR;
W
Y
= q = (1  s)(xqR + (1  x)qP ) (24)
Since output grows at a constant rate, the steady-state increase in W=Y follow-
ing a rise in x must imply a transitory process of increasing wealth and (above
steady-state) capital gains to share holders.5
4This mechanism is at the heart of Kaldors neo-Pasinetti theorem; Kaldor (1966), Skott
(1981).
5This can be seen formally from equation (14): an increase in x implies a drop in qR (for
given WR), and _vN=WR is decreasing in qR:
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3.2 Endogenous changes in 
The desired portfolio composition depends on the expected returns, but the
adjustment is unlikely to be instantaneous.6 Thus, I assume that the change in
 is determined by
_ = ((re)  ); 0 > 0;  > 0 (25)
where  is the desired share of equity and re is the expected rate of return
on equity (the return on deposits the other asset is taken to be constant at
zero).
A standard mainstream assumption of rational expectations makes little
sense in a world of profound uncertainty. Instead, real-world expectations seem
to have a strong adaptive or conventional element. If returns have been high
for a long time, there is a tendency to think that this will continue.7 Using a
simple adaptive specication, I assume that
_re = (r   re) (26)
where r is the current rate of return on equity. From the denitions s = sf; x =
YR=(R+YP ) and equations (5), (14) and (16), it follows that the current return
can be written
r =
(1  sf )Y
vN
+ v^
= (1  sf ) Y
YR + YP
YR + YP
YR
YR
WR
WR
vN
+
_vN
WR
WR
vN
= [
   s
1  s
1
x
1

+
1  a
1   ]
1
qR
+
1
1   (^  b) (27)
Equation (27) gives r as a function of ; qR and ^: Hence, substituting (27)
into (26), equations (20), (25) and (26) constitute a three dimensional system of
di¤erential equations in re; ; qR:8 The system has a unique stationary solution
with  > 0, and the Routh-Hurwitz conditions for local stability are satised
if the portfolios respond slowly to changes in current returns. This response
is determined by ;  and 0; and given any two of these, local stability can
be achieved by reducing the third su¢ ciently (see Appendix A). These results
are not surprising. If  = 0; the system becomes two dimensional and this new
2D system is recursive: for a given re equation (25) is a stable one-dimensional
equation in , and for a given  equation (20) is a stable equation in qR: From
the Routh-Hurwitz conditions for the original 3D system it can also be seen,
however, that stability can easily be lost for high values of ;  or 0:
6The adjustment may be gradual partly because households do not keep continuous track
of their own nancial wealth (Kennickell and Starr-McCluer, 1997).
7Conventional elements in a slightly di¤erent form are central to Minskys nancial insta-
bility hypothesis, and the specications in this section have similarities with Ryoos (2010)
model of a Minskian long wave.
8For simplicity, I consider the e¤ects of a change in the level of x: A change in x^ would
complicate the analysis since the system fails to be autonomous if x^ 6= 0:
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Figure 1a: Initial value qR = 4:1 Figure 1b: Initial value qR = 4:043060432395
Figure 1c: Initial value qR = 4:04305 Figure 1d: Initial value qR = 3:95
The analysis is conrmed by the simulations. Interestingly, corridor stability
can be observed for a range of parameter values. This is illustrated in gures
1a1d which show the projection of the 3D system on the (re; ) plane.9 The
four gures use the same parameter values, and the initial disturbance a fall in
9The simulations use the specication (re) = 0+1re . The parameters and exogenous
variables take the values  s
1 s = 0:1; x = 0:5; a = 0:7; b = 0:04;  = 0:4;  = 0:4; 0 =
44=75; 1 = 1:
With these values the stationary solution is given by r = re = 0:08;  = 2=3; qK = 6: The
solution is locally stable. Gradual increases in 1 (or in  or ) would take the system through
a subcritical Hopf bifurcation.
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the wealth-income ratio qR compared to the stationary solution corresponds
to the e¤ect of a shock to the share of the rich in distributed income.10 The
shift in distribution produces higher returns to equity and as a result both re
and  start to rise in all four cases. The system is stable and returns to the
stationary solution after the small shock in gure 1a; slightly larger shocks
takes the system out of the stable corridor and leads to divergence (gures 1b-
1c), and the divergence becomes monotonic if the size of the shock is increased
even further (gure 1d).
4 Conclusions
The model in this paper highlights a particular mechanism that may have con-
tributed to the stock market boom in the 1990s. The model has many limitations
and it clearly provides at best one element for an understanding of nancial
instability. But it shows that the intuition behind inequality-induced bubbles is
logically sound.
Variations in portfolio shares are central to the story (and portfolio shares
do exhibit considerable variation over time), but inequality is not the only
factor that inuences the average portfolio composition. Indeed, the income-
distribution argument relies on the more general observation that relative asset
demands depend on the composition and conditions of households. Thus, the
same type of reasoning suggests that other structural features will a¤ect average
portfolio decisions demographic changes is an obvious source as are pension
reforms or tax changes and the destabilizing feedback e¤ects from capital gains
to portfolio shifts does not depend of the specic initial shock. An attempt to
testthe empirical relevance of the mechanism therefore raises a host of issues
and is well beyond this initial exploration.
5 Appendix A
5.1 Existence of a stationary solution
Substituting _ = 0 in (20) and setting the left hand side equal to zero we get
qR =
1  a
b+ (1  )g (28)
Using (27)-(28), the value of r at a stationary solution must satisfy
r = [
   s
1  s
1
x
1

+
1  a
1   ]
b+ (1  )g
1  a  
1
1  b
=
   s
1  s
1
x
1

b+ (1  )g
1  a + g (29)
10A shock to x is associated with a shock to the wealth-income ratio qR =WR=((1 s)xY );
but has no direct impact on the other two state variables, re and :
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This expression for r is decreasing in ; and since  is increasing in re it follows
that multiple solutions with  > 0 are ruled out. The existence of a solution
follows from the observation that r !1 for ! 0 and r ! r0 < g for !1.
Thus, a solution exists as long as (g) <1, a condition that is clearly met.
5.2 Local stability properties
The local stability properties of the stationary solution are determined by the
Jacobian which, evaluated at the stationary solution, takes the form
J(re; ; qR) =
0B@ (
1
1 
1

0   1) (  s1 s 1x 12qR +
g
(1 )2   1(1 ))  ( s1 s 1x 1q2R +
1
q2R
1 a
1  )
0   0
1
1 
0 1
1  (g   )   11  1 aq2R
1CA
(30)
The necessary and su¢ cient Routh-Hurwitz conditions for local stability of
the linearized system are that
1. Tr(J) = A    11  1 aq2R < 0
2. Det(J1)+Det(J2)+Det(J3) = 0B+(+ 11 
1 a
q2R
)+ 11 
1 a
q2R
> 0
3. Det(J) = (0C   11  1 aq2R ) < 0
4.  Tr(J)[Det(J1) +Det(J2) +Det(J3)] +Det(J) > 0
where
A =
1
1  
1

0   1
B =
   s
1  s
1
x
1
qR
[
1

+
1
(1  )qR ] 
1
(1  ) [
1

1  a
q2R
+ g]
C =     s
1  s
1
x
1
q2R
1
1   [g +
1  a
qR
] < 0
Condition 3 is satised. Conditions 1,2 and 4, however, will not be met unless
;  and 0 are su¢ ciently small.
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